[INDIA] RBI, SEBI and IRDAI · Source-code escrow and continuity obligations for critical applications[EU DORA] ICT third-party risk testing required · In force Jan 2025[PRA] SS2/21 UK · Vendor recovery evidence required[MAS] Singapore TRM · Independent vendor recoverability expected[APRA] CPS 230 Australia · Third-party continuity obligations in force[FFIEC] United States · Source-code access and software escrow addressed in third-party contracts[ENTERPRISE] Mission-critical software procurement increasingly requires continuity evidence before contract
[INDIA] RBI, SEBI and IRDAI · Source-code escrow and continuity obligations for critical applications[EU DORA] ICT third-party risk testing required · In force Jan 2025[PRA] SS2/21 UK · Vendor recovery evidence required[MAS] Singapore TRM · Independent vendor recoverability expected[APRA] CPS 230 Australia · Third-party continuity obligations in force[FFIEC] United States · Source-code access and software escrow addressed in third-party contracts[ENTERPRISE] Mission-critical software procurement increasingly requires continuity evidence before contract

EUROPEAN UNION · IN FORCE SINCE 17 JAN 2025

EU DORADigital Operational Resilience Act — Regulation (EU) 2022/2554

DORA requires financial entities to keep ICT third-party risk under control across the full lifecycle of a contract — including a documented exit strategy and assurance that a critical or important function can continue if a provider fails (Article 28). This guide explains the requirement, scope, timeline and evidence mapping for software escrow and Software Recoverability.

REGULATORY EVIDENCE MAP

EU DORA

In force since 17 January 2025
01

PERIMETER

European Union

02

REQUIREMENT

A board-owned strategy on ICT third-party risk for critical or important functions

03

CASTLER EVIDENCE

Each vendor release is rebuilt and re-deployed independently, then sealed as a signed Proof of Recovery

OUTPUT

Signed Proof of Recovery

ARTICLE ANATOMY

EU DORA — Articles 9(2), 28 and 30

In force since 17 January 2025

Who it applies to

  • Credit and payment institutions
  • Investment firms
  • Insurance and reinsurance undertakings
  • Crypto-asset service providers

DORA is already applicable. Financial entities should maintain the register, contractual controls, exit plans, and testing evidence required for critical or important ICT functions.

Requirement

A board-owned strategy on ICT third-party risk for critical or important functions

Castler artefact

Each vendor release is rebuilt and re-deployed independently, then sealed as a signed Proof of Recovery

Requirement

Documented, regularly reviewed exit strategies that do not disrupt the supported function

Castler artefact

Your exit strategy stops being a document and becomes a demonstrated, repeatable procedure

Requirement

Assurance of business continuity if a provider fails, is sanctioned, or can no longer deliver

Castler artefact

Continuity is evidenced per release — examinable by your board and your regulator

Requirement

A maintained register of contractual arrangements and resilience testing

Castler artefact

Recovery is re-verified on every release, keeping the resilience register current

THE GLOBAL REGULATORY MANDATE

The regulator stopped asking “Do you have escrow?” It now asks “Can you prove recovery?”

Across financial regulation, cyber-resilience rules and global assurance standards, the direction is converging: critical third-party software must remain current, testable and recoverable when its provider fails.

17

MANDATES

9

JURISDICTIONS

European UnionUnited KingdomUnited StatesAustraliaSingaporeSaudi ArabiaUnited Arab EmiratesGlobal StandardsIndia
Explore every mandate and evidence map

1 · WHAT THE REGULATION IS

What is EU DORA?

Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 was adopted by the European Union to create a common digital-operational-resilience standard for the financial sector. It has applied since 17 January 2025.

DORA requires financial entities to keep ICT third-party risk under control across the full lifecycle of a contract — including a documented exit strategy and assurance that a critical or important function can continue if a provider fails (Article 28). For a CIO, CISO or compliance officer, the practical issue is whether a critical third-party application can remain available when the provider fails, exits, is acquired or can no longer support the product.

Software escrow addresses custody: who holds the source code, build materials and documentation. Software Recoverability addresses the next question: whether those materials have been independently rebuilt, deployed and tested. The distinction matters because an agreement and a deposit do not prove that recovery can be completed within the institution’s operational tolerance.

Castler therefore treats the requirement as part of vendor onboarding. The agreement and first deposit are established when the relationship begins, every release is captured, and the verification evidence is renewed before an auditor, insurer or supervisor asks for it.

2 · EXACT REQUIREMENT

EU DORA — Articles 9(2), 28 and 30

In summary

Article 28 requires financial entities to manage ICT third-party risk as an integral part of their ICT risk management framework. Article 30 requires contractual provisions that support contingency measures and exit strategies for critical or important functions.

Reference: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 — Articles 9(2), 28 and 30. For legal interpretation and exact operative wording, use the current official text and advice applicable to your supervisory perimeter.

In practical terms, compliance requires more than a clause in the vendor contract. The institution must identify which applications are critical, establish custody or source-code access, ensure the deposited materials remain current, document release conditions and maintain evidence that continuity or exit can be executed.

Where the framework requires tested recovery, resilience or credible exit, a stored deposit is only the starting control. Independent build evidence, deployment instructions, architecture replication and a signed engineer review show that the recovery path has been exercised rather than assumed.

3 · Who it applies to

Credit and payment institutions

Investment firms

Insurance and reinsurance undertakings

Crypto-asset service providers

Institutions for occupational retirement provision

Critical ICT third-party service providers

The accountable group normally includes technology, information security, outsourcing, procurement, compliance, business continuity and the business owner of the supported service. Scope should be based on criticality, not only contract value.

4 · Compliance timeline

In force since 17 January 2025

DORA is already applicable. Financial entities should maintain the register, contractual controls, exit plans, and testing evidence required for critical or important ICT functions.

Institutions should work backwards from the operative date. Vendor identification, agreement execution, repository integration, initial deposit, reconciliation and first verification all require lead time. Onboarding-first implementation avoids a deadline-driven retrofit.

5 · CONSEQUENCES

What happens when the evidence is missing?

Supervisors can require remediation, impose administrative measures and penalties available under national implementation, and intensify scrutiny of third-party arrangements that cannot demonstrate credible continuity or exit capability.

The operational consequence can be more severe than the supervisory consequence. If a critical provider fails and the deposited software cannot be built or deployed, the institution may breach customer commitments, impact tolerances, market obligations and board-approved continuity objectives while the technical team reconstructs undocumented knowledge under incident conditions.

A current custody record and signed Proof of Recovery reduce that uncertainty. They do not replace legal analysis, incident planning or the institution’s own controls; they create tested technical evidence that those controls rely on.

6 · CASTLER EVIDENCE MAPPING

How Castler maps to EU DORA.

The mapping is specific: each obligation is paired with the Castler artefact or operating control that provides relevant evidence. It is not a claim that software alone guarantees compliance.

Regulatory requirementCastler evidence
A board-owned strategy on ICT third-party risk for critical or important functionsEach vendor release is rebuilt and re-deployed independently, then sealed as a signed Proof of Recovery
Documented, regularly reviewed exit strategies that do not disrupt the supported functionYour exit strategy stops being a document and becomes a demonstrated, repeatable procedure
Assurance of business continuity if a provider fails, is sanctioned, or can no longer deliverContinuity is evidenced per release — examinable by your board and your regulator
A maintained register of contractual arrangements and resilience testingRecovery is re-verified on every release, keeping the resilience register current

7 · FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

EU DORA questions from compliance and technology teams.

Does having a software escrow agreement satisfy the requirement?

An agreement can satisfy the contractual custody element, but EU DORA also expects the institution to manage continuity, third-party risk or recovery evidence. The exact answer depends on the clause and supervisory perimeter.

How current must the source-code deposit be?

The deposit should track the production release. Automated repository capture, version history and release identifiers make it possible to show that updates and fixes are included rather than relying on the original filing.

Does the software vendor need to participate in every verification?

The vendor participates in onboarding, deposit setup and structured reconciliation where documentation is missing. Verification is then designed to run independently so the vendor does not need to be present every time.

What evidence should be presented to an auditor or supervisor?

Present the executed escrow arrangement, deposit and release history, build report, deployment runbook, replication report, SBOM, confidence score, exception record and signed Proof of Recovery for the release in scope.

Can an institution begin with custody and add verification later?

Yes. Cloud Custody establishes the current deposit and agreement. The same record can be upgraded to Standard or Premium Software Recoverability without creating a new custody foundation.

How often should recoverability be re-tested?

Re-test when the vendor releases a material version and according to the institution’s criticality, regulatory and board-approved assurance cycle. Per-release verification avoids stale annual evidence.

CASTLER SRP EVIDENCE

How Castler SRP satisfies EU DORA ICT third-party risk requirements

EU DORA requires financial entities to maintain documented, tested and recoverable arrangements for critical ICT third-party dependencies. Castler SRP produces engineer-signed Proof of Recovery for each verified release — the independent test evidence DORA examiners expect.

EU DORA

Make the recovery claim examinable

Bring your EU DORA perimeter. We’ll map the critical systems, current custody and Proof of Recovery evidence required for a defensible procedure.

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