[INDIA] RBI, SEBI and IRDAI · Source-code escrow and continuity obligations for critical applications[EU DORA] ICT third-party risk testing required · In force Jan 2025[PRA] SS2/21 UK · Vendor recovery evidence required[MAS] Singapore TRM · Independent vendor recoverability expected[APRA] CPS 230 Australia · Third-party continuity obligations in force[FFIEC] United States · Source-code access and software escrow addressed in third-party contracts[ENTERPRISE] Mission-critical software procurement increasingly requires continuity evidence before contract
[INDIA] RBI, SEBI and IRDAI · Source-code escrow and continuity obligations for critical applications[EU DORA] ICT third-party risk testing required · In force Jan 2025[PRA] SS2/21 UK · Vendor recovery evidence required[MAS] Singapore TRM · Independent vendor recoverability expected[APRA] CPS 230 Australia · Third-party continuity obligations in force[FFIEC] United States · Source-code access and software escrow addressed in third-party contracts[ENTERPRISE] Mission-critical software procurement increasingly requires continuity evidence before contract

ENERGY & UTILITIES

The grid does not stop. Neither can the software that runs it

Power generators, transmission operators and DISCOMs depend on third-party SCADA, EMS, AMI and grid-management software. Castler independently rebuilds critical vendor applications and produces signed Proof of Recovery to support power-sector resilience and CII obligations.

ISO 27001SOC 2 Type IICERT-InPCI DSS

ENERGY SOFTWARE ESTATE

Recovery evidence across control and grid operations

01SCADA · control
RECOVERY PATH
02EMS · dispatch
RECOVERY PATH
03AMI · metering
RECOVERY PATH

SIGNED OUTPUT

Proof of Recovery · per system · per verified release

THE PROBLEM

Energy infrastructure is software-dependent — and vendor-dependent

Smart metering, automated grid management, renewable dispatch and real-time demand operations rely on third-party software and OEM knowledge. A deposit that has never been rebuilt outside the supplier's environment is not yet a tested recovery path.

OEM discontinuation

A grid-management OEM retires an India-specific product after an acquisition. The operator is left with production software but no independently tested path to rebuild or redeploy it.

Software supply-chain attack

A compromise in an OEM update channel affects a SCADA or energy-management environment. Recovery depends on whether the deposited release, configuration and deployment procedure are complete.

Geopolitical supply risk

Export restrictions or support withdrawal interrupt access to a foreign OEM. The operator must sustain a critical system while replacement procurement and migration are still underway.

THE REGULATORY MANDATE

Power-sector resilience is a critical-infrastructure obligation

NCIIPC guidance includes disaster-recovery and business-continuity controls for CII. The CEA's cyber-security function covers CII identification, incident response, asset governance and trusted-vendor implementation, while Ministry of Power requirements address testing imported power-system components for embedded cyber threats.

NCIIPC CII guidance

IT Act 2000 §70 · CII protection and disaster-recovery / BCP controls

Proof of Recovery + Deployment Runbook

THE SOLUTION

Verified recoverability for every layer of the energy software stack

Castler's agentic verification engine rebuilds critical energy software in a clean environment without depending on the OEM's operating team. A named Castler engineer reviews the evidence and signs the resulting recovery pack.

01

SCADA and control systems

Supervisory-control software, configuration and deployment artefacts maintained in current custody and independently tested for recovery readiness.

02

Energy management systems

EMS, DERMS, dispatch and grid-optimisation platforms covered under a release-specific Software Estate programme.

03

AMI and smart metering

Advanced metering infrastructure, meter-data management and head-end systems verified against the declared architecture.

REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAMME

A practical path from stale OEM deposits to signed recovery evidence

This is an illustrative audit-readiness model, not a claimed customer engagement. Scope and timelines depend on system complexity, safety constraints, deposit quality and OEM cooperation.

01

Prioritise the critical stack

Map SCADA, EMS, AMI, billing and grid-operations systems by operational consequence and OEM dependency.

02

Reconcile current custody

Bring source, configuration, infrastructure definitions and runbooks into controlled custody and identify undocumented dependencies.

03

Verify and sign

Rebuild each scoped release independently, test the declared deployment procedure and issue the signed Proof of Recovery pack.

OUTPUT PACKBuild ReportDeployment RunbookReplication ReportSBOMSigned Proof of Recovery

ENERGY & UTILITIES

Map the energy Software Estate to the recovery evidence it needs

Bring your critical SCADA, EMS, AMI and grid-software vendor estate. We will map custody, verification and signed evidence in a 15-minute briefing.

Book a 15-min briefing
ISO 27001SOC 2 Type IIPCI DSS

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